The Strategic Value of Recall

Ron Peretz ()

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results [Lehrer, Neyman and Okada] on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007-11
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