Elections Can be Manipulated Often

Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2008-04
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