Spurious Consensus and Opinion Revision: Why Might People Be More Confident in Their Less Accurate Judgments?

Ilan Yaniv, Shoham Choshen-Hillel and Maxim Milyavsky

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: In the interest of improving their decision-making, individuals revise their opinions on the basis of samples of opinions obtained from others. However, such a revision process may lead decision-makers to experience greater confidence in their less accurate judgments. We theorize that people tend to underestimate the informative value of independently drawn opinions, if these appear to conflict with one another, yet place some confidence even in the "spurious consensus" which may arise when opinions are sampled interdependently. The experimental task involved people’s revision of their opinions (caloric estimates of foods) on the basis of advice. The method of sampling the advisory opinions (independent or interdependent) was the main factor. The results reveal a dissociation between confidence and accuracy. A theoretical underlying mechanism is suggested whereby people attend to consensus (consistency) cues at the expense of information on interdependence. Implications for belief-updating and for individual and group decisions are discussed.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-upt
Date: 2008-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp492

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