Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games

Ziv Hellman

Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the question of extending the definition of the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a repeated setting. The focus is on situations in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative games in each time period. Two alternative definitions of what a `sequence of coalitions' means in such a context are considered, in respect to which the concept of a repeated game bargaining set may be defined, and existence and non-existence results are studied. A solution concept we term subgame-perfect bargaining set sequences is also defined, and sufficient conditions are given for the nonemptiness of subgame-perfect solutions in the case of a finite number of time periods.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2009-10

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/dp_files/dp523.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp523

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ron Peretz ().