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Cores and stable sets of finite dimensional games
Luigi Montrucchio ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research
In this paper we study exact TU games having finite dimensional non-atomic cores, a class of games that includes relevant economic games. We first characterize them by showing that they are a particular type of market games. Using this characterization, we then show that in such a class the cores are their unique von Neumann- Morgenstern stable sets.
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