Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data

Pierre Dubois () and Tomislav Vukina

No 393, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

JEL-codes: D82 L24 Q12 K32 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-law and nep-mic
Date: 2008-12
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n°4, juillet 2009, p. 489-552.[ Texte complet ]

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http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2008/optimal_contract.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: evidence from production contracts data (2005)
Journal Article: Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: Evidence from production contracts data (2009)
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