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Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous
Philippe De Donder and
John Roemer ()
No 414, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D62 H82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n°3, mai 2009, p. 414-423. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.11.003 .[ Texte complet ]
Downloads: (external link)http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2006/mixed.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Related works: Working Paper: Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous (2006) Working Paper: Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous (2006) Working Paper: Mised Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous (2006) Journal Article: Mixed oligopoly equilibria when firms' objectives are endogenous (2009) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:6163
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