SubGame, set and match. Identifying Incentive Response in a Tournament

Andrew Leach ()

No 04-02, Cahiers de recherche from HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée

Abstract: Data from Association de Tennis Professionel (ATP) championship tennis tournament finals are used to test for strategic behavior of players and their responses to incentives. Tennis provides a rich environment for the study of incentive response because of the individual nature of the sport, and the clearly defined tournament structure. The parameters of a sequential game model are estimated and, controlling for measured ability differences, the existence of strategic decision making where players’ efforts vary depending on the state of the match is tested against the alternative that players do not alter their effort in response to incentives.

Keywords: Tournaments; Sequential games; Incentive Response Nash Equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C15 C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-spo
Date: 2003-09
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