Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach

Biung-Ghi Ju ()

No 717, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Korea University

Abstract: We introduce a notion of conditionally decisive powers of which the exercise depends on social consent. Decisive powers, or the so-called libertarian rights, are examples and much weaker forms of powers are covered by our notion. We provide an axiomatic characterization of existence of a system of powers and its uniqueness as well as characterizations of various families of rules represented by systems of powers. Critical axioms are monotonicity, independence, and symmetric linkage (person i and i's issues should be treated symmetrically to person j and j's issues for at least one linkage between issues and persons).

Keywords: Powers; Consent; Libertarian Rights; Monotonicity; Independence; Symmetric linkage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2007

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Related works:
Working Paper: Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach (2005)
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