Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution: A Reconsideration

Somdeb Lahiri ()

No 1999-10-07, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: The present paper attempts to provide simple proofs of two theorems in the literature of axiomatic bargaining with a variable population. Both theorems deal with axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solution due to Kalai (1997), in the variable population framework. The egalitarian solution assigns to a bargaining problem (arising out of the problem of dividing a bundle of goods amongst a finite number of agents) the utility allocation which is both Weakly Pareto Optimal and has equal coordinates. There are several exhaustive treatments of the central issues in axiomatic bargaining with a variable population, notably Thomson and Lensberg (1985). The origins of this line of speech can be traced to Thomson (1983a).

Date: 1999-10-07

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