Axiomatic Characterizations of Voting Operators

Somdeb Lahiri ()

No 1999-11-03, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we provide a model for the analysis of the electoral process. We prove some theorems in this paper, which characterize some voting operators. Apart form other well-known voting operators existing in the literature, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of the first past the post voting rule. In a final section, we take up the problem of a rationalizable voting operators. It is observed that except in the trivial case where every feasible alternative that is voted for by somebody, is chosen, no other voting operator is rationalizable. However, we are able to offer a necessary and sufficient condition for voting operators, to always select the best elements from the feasible set, according to a reflexive, complete and transitive binary relations.

Date: 1999-11-03

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Journal Article: Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators (2001)
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