Axiomatic Characterisation of Weighted Voting Operator

Somdeb Lahiri ()

No 2000-10-03, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: A federation voting operator allows a finite set of coalitions to unilaterally elect any outcome. There are several special types of federation voting operators, all of which share a property: the candidates are assigned weights, and for a coalition to be decisive, it is necessary that the sum of the weights of its members exceed a pre-assigned quota. In this paper we address the following question: When is a Federation Voting Operator a Weighted Voting Operator?

Date: 2000-10-03

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