Axiomatic Characterisation of Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregators

Somdeb Lahiri ()

No 2001-02-02, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: A Federation Boolean Vote Aggregator allows a finite set of coalitions to unilaterally elect any candidate from a set containing exactly two candidates. There are several special types of Federation Boolean Vote Aggregators, all of which share a property: the candidates are assigned weights, and for a coalition to be decisive, it is necessary that the sum of the weights of its members exceed a pre-assigned quota. In this paper we address the following question: When is a Federation Boolean Vote aggregator a Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregator?

Date: 2001-02-02

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