Antitrust in Open Economies

Joseph Francois () and Henrik Horn ()

The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS

Abstract: We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model, contrasting national and multilateral (cooperative) determination of competition policy, exploring the properties of the policy equilibrium. It is not imperfect competition, but variation in competitive stance between sectors that matters for trading partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies relate to countries’ comparative advantages, and hurt the factor intensively used, or specific to, the imperfectly competitive sector. They also create a competitive advantage for export firms. FDI can be pro-competitive in this context, reducing the scope for beggar-thy-neighbor policies and reducing the gains from a multilateral competition agreement.

Keywords: antitrust policy; competition policy; merger policy; trade and imperfect competition; FDI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 F12 F3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04-05
Note: Length:
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp120.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Antitrust in Open Economies (2006)
Working Paper: Antitrust in Open Economies (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS
Address: 01
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Eva Mateo ().