Abstract:
We analyze the migrant smuggling market where smugglers differ in their capacities to exploit their clients' labor in the destination. We show that when exploitation capacities are private information, the equilibrium may be characterized by adverse selection. In such a case, policies that diminish the availability of smuggling services to potential migrants inevitably raise the mean exploitation of smuggled labor.
Keywords:migrant smuggling; migrant exploitation (search for similar items in EconPapers) New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg Date: Written 2007-02-19 Note: Length:
More papers in The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS Address: 01 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Eva Mateo ().
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