Partial Credit Guarantees: Principles and PracticeThe Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS Abstract: Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced renewed interest from governments keen to promote financial access for small enterprises. While the market can find used for partial credit guarantees, the attractions for public policy can be illusory: indeed their most attractive feature for myopic politicians may be the ease with which the true cost of guarantees can be understated, at least at the outset. In practice, the actual fiscal cost of existing schemes has varied widely across countries and has represented a high per dollar subsidy in some cases. Despite the recent application of some innovative techniques, the social benefit of such schemes have proved difficult to estimate, not least because their goals have been vague. Operational design has influenced the cost and apparent effectiveness of different schemes and has also varied widely. Clear and precise goals, against which performance is regularly monitored, realistic pricing verified by consistent and transparent accounting, and attention to the incentive features of operational design, especially for the intermediaries, are among the prerequisites for such schemes to have a good chance of truly achieving improvements in social welfare. New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp244 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS |
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