Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

Anirban Kar (), Indrajit Ray () and Roberto Serrano ()

No 2007-03, Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales

Abstract: We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium distribution; implementation; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007-02-28
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Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior

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Related works:
Working Paper: MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AS A DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS (2005)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions (2005)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions (2005)
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