The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environment Protection

Per G. Fredriksson () and Muthukumara Mani

No 02/49, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We develop and test a theory of the rule of law and environmental policy formation. In our model an increase in the degree of rule of law has two opposing partial effects on environmental policy: first, a greater share of policy decisions are implemented according to law; second, industry bribery efforts increase because more is at stake. Moreover, we find that an increase in corruptibility of policymakers lowers the stringency of environmental policy. The empirical findings suggest that a greater degree of rule of law raises environmental policy stringency, but the effect is lower where corruptibility is high.

Keywords: Environment; Corruption; Economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-28
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