Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank

Olivier Jeanne () and Lars E.O. Svensson ()

No 04/162, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.

Keywords: Deflation; Liquidity; Central Banks; Interest rates; Exchange rates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fin, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2004-09-13
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Related works:
Working Paper: Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank (2004)
Working Paper: Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank (2004)
Journal Article: Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank (2007)
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