Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

Ross Levine () and Luc Laeven ()

No 07/140, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Keywords: Working Paper; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Date: 2007-06-22
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Related works:
Working Paper: Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2006)
Journal Article: Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2008)
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