Political Risk Aversion

Laura Valderrama

No 09/194, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show a non-monotonic relationship between institutional efficiency and the size of innovation.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Corporate sector; Economic models; Labor mobility; Political economy; Productivity; Technology transfer; Voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-upt
Date: 2009-09-14

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:09/194

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