Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms

Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India

Abstract: We examine a model of price competition where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity, and are free to supply less than the quantity demanded. We demonstrate that if the tie-breaking rule is `non-manipulable', then, for a large class of rationing rules, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever the number of firms is large enough. We then show that the `folk theorem' of perfect competition holds. Finally, we examine if the results go through when the firms are asymmetric, or produce to order.

Keywords: Bertrand equilibrium; pure strategy; non-manipulable tiebreaking rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D41 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2004-02
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms (2007)
Journal Article: Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms (2008)
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