Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices

Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India

Abstract: We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object secondprice auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price set at the lowest bidder valuation.

Keywords: Auctions; ceilings; collusion; reserve prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices (2006)
Journal Article: Controlling collusion in auctions: The role of ceilings and reserve prices (2008)
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