Deterrence, preemption and panic: A Common-enemy problem of terrorism

Satya P. Das () and Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India

Abstract: We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counterterrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality, injury and loss of property, but also the resultant fear. The fear-effect leads to different kinds of equilibria and implications for counter-terrorism policies. In particular, the model identifies conditions under which greater pre-emption may be the rational response to an increase in terrorism, i.e., it analyzes the merit of the dictum: "offense is the best defense." Further, it examines the characteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism; Preemption; Panic; Deterrence; Cooperation; Target Countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 F52 F53 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
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Working Paper: Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism (2008)
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