Characterization of the walrasian equilibria of the assignment model

Debasis Mishra () and Dolf Talman ()
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Debasis Mishra: Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi

Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers from Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India

Abstract: We study the assignment model where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the extreme and interior points of the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors for this model. Our characterizations are in terms of demand sets of buyers. Using these characterizations, we also give a unique characterization of the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vectors. Also, necessary and suncient conditions are given under which the interior of the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is non-empty. Several of the results are derived by interpreting Walrasian equilibrium price vectors as potential functions of an appropriate directed graph.

JEL-codes: D50 C69 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
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