Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Wolfgang J. Luhan (), Martin Georg Kocher () and Matthias Sutter ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck

Abstract: While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Keywords: Experiment; dictator game; team behavior; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: 2007-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered (2006)
Journal Article: Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-12

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