Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and teams

Matthias Sutter ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck

Abstract: Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender’s (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of ‘sophisticated’ deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions.

Keywords: Deception; Expectations; Team decision making; Individual decision making; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2007-10-23

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uibk.ac.at/fakultaeten/volkswirtschaft_ ... n/wpaper/2007-26.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence From Individuals and Teams (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-26

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Matthias Sutter ().