The dos and don'ts of leadership in sequential public goods experiments

M. Fernanda Rivas () and Matthias Sutter ()

Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck

Abstract: We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative importance of reward and punishment as leadership devices, (ii) whether endogenous leadership is more efficient than exogenously enforced leadership, and (iii) whether leaders contributing last, instead of first, also increase contributions. The experimental results are: (i) Reward options yield lower contributions than punishment through exclusion. (ii) Endogenous leadership is much more efficient than exogenously imposed leadership. (iii) Sequentiality itself is not beneficial for contributions since groups where the leader contributes as the last member do not contribute more than groups without a leader.

Keywords: Public goods experiment; Leadership; Exclusion power; Reward; Endogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-pbe
Date: 2008-12
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uibk.ac.at/fakultaeten/volkswirtschaft_ ... n/wpaper/2008-25.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2008-25

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Matthias Sutter ().