Guilt-averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioural motivations in the trust game
Yola Engler (),
Rudolf Kerschbamer () and
Lionel Page ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back-transfers and second- order beliefs of the trustor: While reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt-aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results.
JEL-codes: C25 C70 C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Guilt-Averse or Reciprocal? Looking at Behavioural Motivations in the Trust Game (2016)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-17
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