Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes

George M. von Furstenberg ()

No 2008-005, Caepr Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract: Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.

Keywords: Overpromising; international agreements; treaty compliance; performance measurement; politics and environment; Kyoto Protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 Q54 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
Date: Written

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2008/CAEPR2008-005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inu:caeprp:2008-005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Caepr Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Stephanie Bennett ().