Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies

Ashish Chaturvedi () and Amihai Glazer
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Ashish Chaturvedi: WZ-Berlin, Germany

No 50614, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a policymaker who must choose between the status quo and proposals made by lobbyists. Each lobbyist aims to maximize the tariff accorded his industry, but realizes that if he proposes too high a tariff, the policymaker may choose the proposal offered by another lobbyist which incorporates a lower tariff. The equilibrium has a positive probability that the policymaker who aims to maximize social welfare adopts a tariff higher than the one he prefers.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2005-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:050614

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