The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity

Amihai Glazer and Stef Proost

No 60712, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general revenues. We describe conditions that make majority voting lead to a toll and capacity level that equals the socially optimal toll and capacity, that is smaller, or that is larger. This model can also explain the decrease over time of user fees for road use.

Keywords: Positive analysis of policy-making and implementation; Externalities; Government policy on transportation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H23 L98 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-ure
Date: 2007-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:060712

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