A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

Jan Brueckner () and Harris Selod ()
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Jan Brueckner: Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine

No 70816, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication of this view is that squatters ``squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners (defensive expenditures by squatter households also help to forestall eviction). Because eviction is thus absent in equilibrium, the model differs crucially from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability.

Keywords: Squatting; Formalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R00 R31 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-geo and nep-ure
Date: 2008-01
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http://www.economics.uci.edu/docs/2007-08/brueckner-16.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries (2008)
Journal Article: A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:070816

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