International Coordination and Domestic Politics

Kimiko Terai ()
Additional contact information
Kimiko Terai: Hosei University

No 80907, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine how international coordination between countries generates a trend to establish an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating movement to international agreement are a politician's opportunistic motive for re-election, and his optimistic expectation of unanimous consent on agreement between countries. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizens by participating in the agreement, he also decides to participate in the agreement, which then brings benefit spillovers to his country. Furthermore it is shown that, by dividing political authorities for coordination between the executive and politicians, observed over-compliance in the agreement by participating countries can be explained.

Keywords: International environmental agreements; Global public goods; Re-election pressure; Division of authorities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 H87 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2008-09
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economics.uci.edu/docs/2008-09/terai-07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:080907

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Vanessa Roche ().