Positive and negative reciprocity in labor market

Paulo Trigo Pereira, Nuno Silva and João Manuel Andrade e Silva

No 2002/03, Working Papers from Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.

Abstract: This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze whether reciprocal behavior survives in a more hostile environment than usually considered in the literature. In fact, positive reciprocity survives in a treatment favoring selfish behavior, although there is a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Besides positive reciprocity there is negative reciprocity in this new treatment. Additionally, this paper highlights the influence of the experimental design, namely the importance of wage cut points, on subjects' behavior.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Gift exchange games; Gift and offense exchange games; Incomplete contracts; Labor relations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~depeco/wp/wp032002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp32002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.
Address: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL
Series data maintained by Vitor Escaria ().