Bid Sensitivity in the Structure of the Vickrey Auction

Jason Shogren (), J. A. Fox, Dermot Hayes () and James Kliebenstein

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A research study explored a version of economist W. Vickrey's second-price, sealed-bid auction used for the valuation of nonmarket goods. The sensitivity of revealed values generated by this variation were examined. A standard second-price auction with repeated market trials was compared to a random nth-price auction and a combinatorial private-collection auction with sequentially-revealed values. Results showed the consistency of revealed values in a low probability risk scenario.

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Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, December 1994, Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 1089-1095.

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:10616

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