Welfare Impacts of Intellectual Property Protection in the Seed Industry

Sergio Horacio Lence, Dermot Hayes (), Alan McCunn, Stephen Smith and William S. Niebur

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the welfare impact of different intellectual property protection (IPP) regimes in private sector seed research and development (R&D). We take into account the period after expiration of legal IPP, and require simultaneous equilibrium in markets for R&D, seeds, and final product. Optimal IPP is remarkably insensitive to alternative parameterizations, except for R&D productivity. Results suggest that optimal IPP is greater than IPP in the U.S. seed corn market, but lower than the IPP that could be attained with genetic use restriction technologies. Optimal IPP is much higher than IPP achieved under open-pollinated crops or where legal IPP is limited.

Keywords: GURT; incentives to innovate; intellectual property rights; seed industry; technology innovation; welfare; terminator gene. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10-17
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Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 2005, Vol. 87, No. 4, pp. 951-968.

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12434

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