Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals

David A. Hennessy

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The article develops a dynamic capital valuation model in which farms can act with farm-varying cost to increase the probability of avoiding an infectious endemic animal disease. Multiple endemic disease equilibria can exist, and the one with the largest set of action takers is socially optimal. Costly capital markets are shown to be a factor in determining the extent of disease. Frictions, such as dealing with a veterinary public health bureaucracy, can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions. Technical innovations can reduce social welfare, and a disease indemnification scheme is also studied. Suggestions for empirical implementation are provided.

Keywords: biosecurity; continuous time; multiple equilibria; Nash behavior; reinfection. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-knm
Date: 2005-12-21
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Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, August 2007, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 698-711.

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http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01001.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals (2005)
Journal Article: Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for Farmed Animals (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12489

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