Abstract:
Only one of two equilibrium possibilities arise in standard overlapping generation models with dynastic preferences: either the altruistic bequest motive is operative for every generation (in which case, Ricardian equivalence obtains) or it is not, for any generation. This paper introduces cross-generational consumption externalities into a AK model with overlapping generations. It is shown that the model economy does not support a steady-state equilibrium in which inheritances are received and bequests left at every date; hence Ricardian equivalence fails. There does exist, however, out-of-steady state equilibria in which the bequest motive is occasionally operative; i.e., there are `deviant' generations that do not leave a bequest even though they received an inheritance, and vice versa. This is in line with commonly-held beliefs in the United States that the World War II generation is `generous' while the baby boomer generation is `stingy' and out to `spend their kids' inheritance'. The cross-generational consumption externalities are also capable of generating endogenous growth cycles that did not exist otherwise.
More papers in Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Address: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Stephanie Bridges ().
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