Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree

Harvey E. Lapan and GianCarlo Moschini ()

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave).

Keywords: Comparative statics; log-concavity; minimum quality standards; quality certification; vertical product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-12

Forthcoming in Economics Letters

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Journal Article: Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:13048

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