Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems

Oscar Volij and Nir Dagan ()

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principal, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

Date: 2002-03-01

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 1997, Vol. 26, pp. 11-26.

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Working Paper: Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems (1997)
Journal Article: Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems (1997)
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