Tax Incidence in Differentiated Product Oligopoly

Simon Anderson (), André de Palma () and Brent Kreider ()

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with differentiated products and price-setting (Bertrand) firms. Both taxes may be passed on to consumers by more than 100 percent, and an increase in the tax rate can increase short run firm profits (and hence the long run number of firms). We provide summary conditions for these effects to arise. The conditions depend on demand curvatures and are written in elasticity form. Surprisingly, the analysis largely corroborates Cournot results with homogeneous demand.

Date: 2002-03-01
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Published in Journal of Public Economics, August 2001, pp. 173-192.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly (1999)
Working Paper: Tax Incidence in Differentiated Product Oligopoly (2000)
Working Paper: Tax incidece in Differentiated product Oligopoly (1999)
Working Paper: Tax Incidence in Differentiated Product Oligopoly (2000)
Journal Article: Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5202

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