The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes under Imperfect Competition

Simon Anderson (), André de Palma () and Brent Kreider ()

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit taxes in imperfectly competitive markets. We provide a simple proof that ad valorem taxes are welfare-superior to unit taxes in the short run when production costs are identical across firms. The proof covers differentiated products and a wide range of market conduct. Cost asymmetries strengthen the case for ad valorem taxation under Cournot competition, but unit taxation may be welfare-superior under Bertrand competition with product differentiation. Ad valorem taxation is superior with free entry under Cournot competition, but not necessarily under price competition when consumers value variety.

Date: Written
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Published in Journal of Public Economics, August 2001, pp. 231-251.

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes under Imperfect Competition (2000)
Working Paper: The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition (1999)
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes Under Imperfect Competition (1999)
Journal Article: The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5203

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