A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Oscar Volij, Nir Dagan () and Eyal Winter ()

Staff General Research Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Date: 2002-03-01
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, Vol. 19, pp. 811-823.

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2000)
Working Paper: A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution (2001)
Journal Article: A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5259

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