Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games

Jeffrey Carpenter (), Stephen V. Burks and Eric A. Verhoogen ()

No 1341, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in "social framing. "Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. This indicates that workers behaved distinctly from both student groups because their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Dictator game; fairness; reciprocity; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J24 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Date: 2004-10
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