Wages, Hours and Human Capital over the Live Cycle

Robert A. Hart () and Yue Ma ()

No 139, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. The model is tested with the British Household Panel Survey (1991-1997) and with the British Labour Force Survey (1993/4).

Keywords: Lifetime wage-hours contracts; asymmetric information; estimated wage- and hour-tenure profiles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-lab
Date: 2000-03

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Journal Article: Wages, Hours and Human Capital Over the Life Cycle (2008)
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