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Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts

Matthias Kräkel () and Dirk Sliwka

No 2054, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent’s outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict non-compete agreement.

Keywords: fine; incentives; incomplete contracts; non-compete agreements; option contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D86 J3 K1 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
Date: 2006-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? -- On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? - On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts (2006) Downloads
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