The Speed of Employer Learning and Job Market Signaling Revisited

Steffen Habermalz ()

No 2309, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed in Altonji and Pierret (1997). The analysis provided indicates that, if employer learning is incomplete, a high speed of employer learning is not necessarily indicative of a low value of job market signaling.

Keywords: employer learning; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 D8 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Date: 2006-09
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