Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child Related Cash- and In-Kind-Benefits

Peter Haan and Katharina Wrohlich ()

No 3128, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer systems. Based on the theory of optimal taxation, combined with microsimulation and microeconometric techniques we derive the welfare function which makes the current German tax and transfer system for single women optimal. Furthermore, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children and asses how reforms of in-kind childcare transfers would affect the welfare function. This analysis allows us to derive conclusions about the optimal design of child related transfers and in-kind benefits.

Keywords: optimal taxation; labor supply behavior; transfers for children (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 C25 J22 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child Related Cash- and In-Kind-Benefits (2007)
Working Paper: Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child Related Cash- and In-Kind-Benefits (2007)
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