The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Pablo Brañas Garza (), Teresa García Muñoz () and Shoshana Neuman ()
Additional contact information
Pablo Brañas Garza: Universidad de Granada
Teresa García Muñoz: Universidad de Granada
Shoshana Neuman: Bar-Ilan University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pablo Brañas-Garza () and Teresa M. García-Muñoz ()

No 3287, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Keywords: punishment; rewards; high stakes; carrot/stick; economics of religion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
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